Systems and methods for emergency duress security code and related instructions

ABSTRACT

A system, method, and computer-usable medium are disclosed for identifying transactions resulting from the access of a financial account while a user is under duress. A user provides a duress shared secret. Instructions associated with the duress shared secret are processed and available financial account operations, along with associated financial account information, are displayed according to the associated instructions. The cash or electronic funds proceeds of a financial transaction operation are tagged with electronic fraud identification data. Tagged funds received by a financial institution are processed to extract their associated fraud identification data, which is then used to generate fraud trail data. If the tagged funds are used to originate follow-on financial transactions, they are likewise tagged with fraud identification data, which is likewise used to generate fraud trail data. Tagged funds are recovered by processing a tagged financial transaction to extract its associated fraud identification data, which is then used to query repositories of fraud trail data. Fraud trail data that matches the query is then processed to determine receiving account information. Rescission transactions are performed to recover funds up to the amount of the tagged financial transaction from the receiving account.

BACKGROUND Field of the Disclosure

Embodiments of the disclosure relate in general to the field ofcomputers and similar technologies, and in particular to softwareutilized in this field. Still more particularly, it provides a system,method, and computer-usable medium for identifying transactionsresulting from the access of a financial account while a user is underduress.

BACKGROUND OF THE DISCLOSURE

Today's consumers no longer need to physically visit their bank orbrokerage to manage their financial accounts. For example, the use ofautomated teller machines (ATMs) has now become commonplace. Inaddition, the advent of on-line banking and stock trading, coupled withthe widespread availability of the Internet and wireless networks,allows many consumers to conveniently access their financial accountspractically anywhere, anytime, and any way they wish. However, today'scriminals have also become more sophisticated. Identity theft is a veryreal and growing problem, and there are innumerable instances ofcriminals forcing a consumer to provide their personal identificationnumber (PIN) at an ATM machine. The incidence of home break-ins are alsoon the rise, with the homeowner being held hostage until they provideaccess to their financial accounts, which are then used by criminals tocommit large scale financial fraud.

In these situations, the consumer may be coerced into providing suchaccess as a result of being physically, verbally, or emotionallyintimidated, either directly or indirectly. For example, the criminalmay threaten physical harm to a loved one of the consumer being heldhostage if such access is not provided. Currently, consumers havelimited methods to indicate they are under duress when performing anon-line financial transaction, whether it is accessing their financialaccounts at an ATM, from their personal computer, or even their mobilephone.

Current approaches to this issue include the provision of secondarypasswords and PINS to be used when the user is under duress. Thesesecondary passwords and PINS may provide temporary, limited, or spoofedaccess to the user's financial accounts. As an example, not allfinancial accounts may be displayed, or alternatively, the accounts arefalsely displayed with low account balances. As another example, theactual account balances are displayed, but account operations, such asfunds transfers, are spoofed instead. However, today's criminals are nowtechnology savvy. They may have prior knowledge of not only the numberand types of financial accounts belonging to the user, but theirrespective value as well. Furthermore, they may use today's technologyto their own advantage and are able to monitor the receipt of fundsbeing transferred into an account they control. In such situations, thecriminal will not be fooled by spoofed financial account operations.They will want to have proof that their fraudulent transactions havebeen completed. Unfortunately, tracking and recovering such fundstransfers is difficult, tedious, and typically less than effective.

BRIEF SUMMARY

A system, method, and computer-usable medium are disclosed foridentifying transactions resulting from the access of a financialaccount while a user is under duress. In various embodiments, a userprovides a duress shared secret to a fraud management system to indicatethat they are providing access to a financial account while underduress. As an example, a user may be coerced into providing such accessas a result of being physically, verbally, or emotionally intimidated,either directly or indirectly. Instructions associated with the duressshared secret are processed, fraud monitoring operations are initiated,and duress event notifications are generated and delivered, as describedin greater detail herein. Available financial account operations, alongwith associated financial account information, are displayed accordingto the associated instructions. If the selected financial accountoperation is to perform a financial transaction, then input receivedfrom the user is processed according to the associated instructions togenerate a financial transaction. Once the financial transaction isgenerated, fraud identification data is then generated from the duressshared secret and data associated with the financial transaction. Invarious embodiments, cash funds, such as those disbursed from anautomated teller machine (ATM) are invisibly imprinted with the fraudidentification information prior to their disbursement. In various otherembodiments, the proceeds of the financial transaction are electronicfunds are tagged with electronic fraud identification data. Once theelectronic funds are tagged with fraud identification data, the fundstransfer of the electronic funds is initiated.

In various embodiments, tagged funds proceeds of a financial transactionare received by a receiving financial institution. In these and otherembodiments, the tagged funds are cash funds or electronic funds. Oncereceived, the tagged funds are processed to extract their associatedfraud identification data. If the tagged funds are cash funds, then atime-stamped fraud identification query is generated and the extractedfraud identification data is appended. The time-stamped fraudidentification query is then transmitted to law enforcement agencies andthe originating financial institution for processing. If the queryresponse is positive, then tagged cash funds are retained for evidencein criminal prosecution and recovery by their originating financialinstitution. If the tagged funds are electronic funds, then atime-stamped acknowledgement of the receipt of a tagged electronic fundstransfer (“tagged EFT receipt”) is generated. The extracted fraudidentification data and the information related to the target receivingaccount are then appended to the tagged EFT receipt, which is thentransmitted to law enforcement agencies, financial network operators,financial clearing houses, and the originating financial institution.The tagged EFT funds are then deposited into the target receivingaccount, which is monitored for the generation of new EFTs. If a new EFTis generated from the target receiving account, then a time-stampedtagged EFT alert (“tagged EFT alert”) is generated and likewisetransmitted to law enforcement agencies, financial network operators,clearing houses, and the financial institution that originated theoriginal tagged EFT. Data related to the outbound EFT is then processedand tagged with the extracted fraud identification data, followed by theinitiation of the outbound EFT. The tagged EFT alert is then stored asfraud trail data.

In various embodiments, tagged funds are recovered by first selecting atagged financial transaction initiated by a user while under duress,followed by extracting its associated fraud identification data.Repositories of fraud trail data, as described in greater detail herein,are then queried to identify matching fraud identification data. Oncematching fraud identification data has been identified, fraud trail datacorresponding to the matching fraud identification data is retrieved andthen processed to determine receiving account information. The receivingaccount is then queried to determine availability of funds. A rescissiontransaction is performed to recover funds up to the amount of the taggedfinancial transaction. If there are insufficient funds available in thereceiving account, then a repository of fraud trail data at thereceiving financial institution is queried to identify tagged fundstransfer transactions originating from the receiving account. Follow-ontagged funds transfer transactions are then selected and processed toextract financial transaction information related to the destinationaccount of the follow-on electronic funds transaction. The destinationaccount is then queried to determine the availability of funds and theprocess is continued with a follow-on rescission transaction.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

Selected embodiments of the disclosure may be understood, and itsnumerous objects and features obtained, when the following detaileddescription is considered in conjunction with the following drawings, inwhich:

FIG. 1 depicts an exemplary client information processing system (IPS)in which embodiments of the disclosure may be implemented;

FIG. 2 is a simplified block diagram of a fraud management system asimplemented in accordance with an embodiment of the disclosure;

FIGS. 3 a-b are a generalized flowchart of the operation of a fraudmanagement system as implemented in accordance with an embodiment of thedisclosure for the management of shared secrets;

FIGS. 4 a-d are a generalized flowchart of the operation of a fraudmanagement system as implemented in accordance with an embodiment of thedisclosure for tagging the proceeds of a financial transaction initiatedby a user while under duress;

FIGS. 5 a-b are a generalized flowchart of the operation of a fraudmanagement system as implemented in accordance with an embodiment of thedisclosure for tracking tagged cash funds proceeds of a financialtransaction initiated by a user while under duress;

FIGS. 6 a-b are a generalized flowchart of the operation of a fraudmanagement system as implemented in accordance with an embodiment of thedisclosure for tracking tagged electronic funds proceeds of a financialtransaction initiated by a while user under duress; and

FIGS. 7 a-b are a generalized flowchart of the operation of a fraudmanagement system as implemented in accordance with an embodiment of thedisclosure for recovering tagged funds proceeds of a financialtransaction initiated by a user while under duress.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

A method, system and computer-usable medium are disclosed foridentifying transactions resulting from the access of a financialaccount while a user is under duress. As will be appreciated by oneskilled in the art, the disclosure may be embodied as a method, system,or computer program product. Accordingly, various embodiments may beimplemented entirely in hardware, entirely in software (includingfirmware, resident software, micro-code, etc.) or in an embodimentcombining software and hardware. These various embodiments may allgenerally be referred to herein as a “circuit,” “module,” or “system.”

For purposes of this disclosure, an information processing system mayinclude any instrumentality or aggregate of instrumentalities operableto compute, classify, process, transmit, receive, retrieve, originate,switch, store, display, manifest, detect, record, reproduce, handle, orutilize any form of information, intelligence, or data for business,scientific, control, or other purposes. For example, an informationprocessing system may be a personal computer, a personal digitalassistant (PDA), a wirelessly-enabled mobile telephone, a server, anetwork storage device, or any other suitable device and may vary insize, shape, performance, functionality, and price. The informationprocessing system may include random access memory (RAM), one or moreprocessing resources such as a central processing unit (CPU) or hardwareor software control logic, read only memory (ROM), and/or other types ofnonvolatile memory. Additional components of the information processingsystem may include one or more disk drives, one or more network portsfor communicating with external devices, as well as various input andoutput (I/O) devices, such as a keyboard, a mouse, and a video display.The information processing system may also include one or more busesoperable to transmit communications between the various hardwarecomponents.

Additionally, various embodiments may take the form of a computerprogram product on a computer-usable storage medium havingcomputer-usable program code embodied in the medium. Any suitablecomputer usable or computer readable medium may be utilized. Thecomputer-usable or computer-readable medium may be, for example, but notlimited to, an electronic, magnetic, optical, electromagnetic, infrared,or semiconductor system, apparatus, device, or propagation medium. Anon-exhaustive list of more specific examples of the computer-readablemedium would include the following: an electrical connection having oneor more wires, an optical fiber, a transmission media such as thosesupporting the Internet or an intranet, a random access memory (RAM), aread-only memory (ROM), an erasable programmable read-only memory (EPROMor Flash memory), a magnetic storage device, a portable computerdiskette, a hard disk, an optical storage device, a portable compactdisc read-only memory (CD-ROM), or a digital versatile disk (DVD). Notethat the computer-usable or computer-readable medium could even be paperor another suitable medium upon which the program is printed, as theprogram can be electronically captured, via, for instance, opticalscanning of the paper or other medium, then compiled, interpreted, orotherwise processed in a suitable manner and then stored in a computermemory. In the context of this document, a computer-usable orcomputer-readable medium may be any medium that can contain, store,communicate, propagate, or transport the program for use by or inconnection with the instruction execution system, apparatus, or device.The computer-usable medium may include a propagated data signal with thecomputer-usable program code embodied therein, either in baseband or aspart of a carrier wave. The computer usable program code may betransmitted using any appropriate medium, including but not limited tothe Internet, wireline, optical fiber cable, wireless, radio frequency(RF), etc.

Computer program code for carrying out operations in various embodimentsmay be written in an object oriented programming language such as Java,Smalltalk, C++ or the like. However, the computer program code forcarrying out operations in various embodiments may also be written inconventional procedural programming languages, such as the “C”programming language or similar programming languages. The program codemay execute entirely on the user's computer, partly on the user'scomputer, as a stand-alone software package, partly on the user'scomputer and partly on a remote computer or entirely on the remotecomputer or server. In the latter scenario, the remote computer may beconnected to the user's computer through a local area network (LAN), awide area network (WAN), a wireless local area network (WLAN), awireless wide area network (WWAN), a or personal area network (PAN). Inaddition, the connection may be made to an external computer (forexample, through the Internet using an Internet Service Provider) usingany combination of telecommunication technologies and protocols operableto establish a network connection for the exchange of information.

Embodiments of the disclosure are described below with reference toflowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams of methods, apparatus(systems) and computer program products. It will be understood that eachblock of the flowchart illustrations and/or block diagrams, andcombinations of blocks in the flowchart illustrations and/or blockdiagrams, can be implemented by computer program instructions. Thesecomputer program instructions may be provided to a processor of ageneral purpose computer, special purpose computer, or otherprogrammable data processing apparatus to produce a machine, such thatthe instructions, which execute via the processor of the computer orother programmable data processing apparatus, create means forimplementing the functions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or blockdiagram block or blocks.

These computer program instructions may also be stored in acomputer-readable memory that can direct a computer, informationprocessing system, or other programmable data processing apparatus, tofunction in a particular manner such that the instructions stored in thecomputer-readable memory produce an article of manufacture includinginstruction means which implement the function/act specified in theflowchart and/or block diagram block or blocks. The computer programinstructions may also be loaded onto a computer or other programmabledata processing apparatus to cause a series of operational steps to beperformed on the computer or other programmable apparatus to produce acomputer implemented process such that the instructions which execute onthe computer or other programmable apparatus provide steps forimplementing the functions/acts specified in the flowchart and/or blockdiagram block or blocks.

FIG. 1 is a generalized block diagram of an exemplary client informationprocessing system (IPS) 100 in which various embodiments may beutilized. Client IPS 100 includes a processor unit 102 that is coupledto one or more buses 134. A display controller 112, which controls adisplay 114, is also coupled to or more buses 134, along with peripheralcontroller 108, which controls one or more peripheral devices 110. Aninput/output (I/O) controller 116 affords communication with various I/Odevices, including a keyboard 118, a mouse 120, a floppy disk drive 122,a Compact Disk-Read Only Memory (CD-ROM) drive 124, a flash drive memory126, and one or more I/O ports 128. The format of the ports connected tothe I/O controller 116 may be any known to those skilled in the art ofcomputer architecture, including but not limited to Universal Serial Bus(USB) ports.

Client IPS 100 is able to communicate with a service provider server 164via a network 162 using a communications controller 130, which iscoupled to one or more buses 134. Network 162 may be the public switchedtelephone network (PSTN), an external network such as the publicInternet, an internal network such as an Ethernet-based local areanetwork (LAN), a Virtual Private Network (VPN) such as a corporateintranet, or any combination of telecommunication technologies andprotocols operable to establish a network connection for the exchange ofinformation. Using network 162, client IPS 100 is able to access serviceprovider server 164.

A storage controller 104 is also coupled to one or more buses 134.Storage controller 104 interfaces with storage disk or drive 106, whichmay comprise a magnetic storage device such as a hard disk or tapedrive. In various embodiments, storage disk or drive 106 populates asystem memory 136, which is also coupled to one or more buses 134. Datathat populates system memory 136 includes the client IPS 100 operatingsystem (OS) 138 and software programs 144.

OS 138 includes a shell 140 for providing transparent user access toresources such as software programs 144. Generally, shell 140 is aprogram that provides an interpreter and an interface between the userand the operating system. More specifically, shell 140 executes commandsthat are entered into a command line user interface or from a file.Thus, shell 140 (as it is called in UNIX®), also called a commandprocessor in Windows®, is generally the highest level of the operatingsystem software hierarchy and serves as a command interpreter. The shellprovides a system prompt, interprets commands entered by keyboard,mouse, or other user input media, and sends the interpreted command(s)to the appropriate lower levels of the operating system (e.g., a kernel142) for processing. While shell 140 generally is a text-based,line-oriented user interface, various embodiments may also support otheruser interface modes, such as graphical, voice, gestural, etc. Asdepicted, OS 138 also includes kernel 142, which includes lower levelsof functionality for OS 138, including services used by other parts ofOS 138 and software programs 144, including memory management, processand task management, disk management, and mouse and keyboard management.

Software programs 144 may include a communications stack 146, browser156, email client 158, and other programs 160. The communications stack146 is operable to implement any communication protocol enabling variousembodiments of the disclosure. Browser 156 includes program modules andinstructions enabling a World Wide Web (WWW) client (i.e., IPS 100) tosend and receive network messages to the Internet using HyperTextTransfer Protocol (HTTP) messaging, thus enabling communication withservice provider server 164. Software programs 144 also include a fraudmanagement system 148. In various embodiments, the fraud managementsystem 148 comprises a shared secret processing module 150, atransaction processing module 152, a transaction tagging module 154, atransaction tracking module 156, and a transaction rescission module158. The fraud management system 148 includes computer executableinstructions for implementing the processes described in FIGS. 2-7described hereinbelow. In one embodiment, client IPS 100 is able todownload the computer executable instructions of the fraud managementsystem 148 from a service provider server 164 located at a remotelocation. In another embodiment, the computer executable instructions ofthe fraud management system 148 are provided by a service provider as aservice, such as a Web service implemented on a Service-OrientedArchitecture (SOA), to the client IPS 100 on an on-demand basis.

The hardware elements depicted in client IPS 100 are not intended to beexhaustive, but rather are representative to highlight components usedby the disclosure. For instance, client IPS 100 may include alternatememory storage devices such as magnetic cassettes, Digital VersatileDisks (DVDs), Bernoulli cartridges, and the like. These and othervariations are intended to be within the spirit and scope of thedisclosure.

FIG. 2 is a simplified block diagram of a fraud management system asimplemented in accordance with an embodiment of the disclosure. Invarious embodiments, a financial account management system 248 comprisesa fraud management system 148, a repository of financial transaction,fraud identification, and fraud trail data 210 and a repository offinancial account data, shared secret data and instructions 212. Thefraud management system 148 further comprises a shared secret processingmodule 150, a transaction processing module, 152, a transaction taggingmodule 154, a transaction tracking module 156, and a transactionrescission module 158. In these and other embodiments, a user 202 usesan access device 204 to establish an on-line session with the sharedsecret processing module 150 of the fraud management system 148 over aconnection to network 162. In various embodiments, an access device 204may comprise an automated teller machine (ATM), a personal computer, alaptop computer, or a tablet computer. The computing device 204 may alsocomprise a personal digital assistant (PDA), a mobile telephone, or anyother suitable device operable to display the financial managementsystem user interface (UI) 208 and establish a connection with network162.

Using financial management system UI 208, the user 202 provides a useridentification (ID) and a shared secret, such as a personalidentification number (PIN) or a password, and is authenticated to theshared secret processing module 150. In various embodiments, the user202 then creates a duress shared secret. As used herein, a duress sharedsecret refers to a shared secret provided by a user to indicate thatthey are providing access to a financial account while under duress. Asan example, a user may be coerced into providing such access as a resultof being physically, verbally, or emotionally intimidated, eitherdirectly or indirectly. Once the duress shared secret is created,instructions to be executed by the fraud management system 148 upon useof the duress shared secret are created and configured. Morespecifically, the instructions are used to determine the degree ofaccess provided to a financial account, the information related to thefinancial account that is displayed, and the actions that are allowed tobe performed as described in greater detail herein.

In various embodiments, the proceeds of a financial transactioninitiated by a user 202 while under duress (“duress financialtransaction”) are tagged. As used herein, a duress financial transactionis a financial transaction initiated by a user while under duress, asdescribed in greater detail herein. In these and other embodiments, theuser 202 provides a duress shared secret while under duress, such asfrom a threat vector 206. Instructions associated with the duress sharedsecret are processed, fraud monitoring operations are initiated, andduress event notifications are generated and delivered, as described ingreater detail herein, indicating that the financial account is beingaccessed while the user is under duress. In one embodiment, theinstructions associated with the duress shared secret include themonitoring of other financial accounts associated with the user 202,such as investment accounts at a trade exchange 232. In anotherembodiment, the associated instructions include the notification of lawenforcement authorities.

Available financial account operations are displayed within thefinancial account management system UI 208 and an account operation isselected to perform according to the associated instructions. Financialinformation associated with the selected financial account operation isthen displayed, within the financial account management system UI 208,likewise according to the associated instructions. If the selectedfinancial account operation is to perform a financial transaction, theninput is received from the user 202 within the financial accountmanagement system UI 208 to generate a financial transaction. As anexample, the input received may include a request to disburse $400.00 incash funds from an automated teller machine (ATM). As another example,the input received may include a request to transfer $25,000.00 from asavings account to a financial account specified by a criminal. As yetanother example, the input received may include a request to place amarket order to sell $600,000.00 worth of securities at their currentmarket price. It will be apparent to those of skill in the art that manysuch examples of received input are possible and the foregoing is notintended to limit the spirit, scope, or intent of the disclosure.

The received input, and the instructions associated with the duressshared secret, is then processed to generate a financial transaction. Inone embodiment, the financial transaction is generated using financialfunds associated with the user. In another embodiment the financialtransaction is generated using funds associated with a financialinstitution. In this embodiment, the financial funds associated with theuser are transferred to an intermediary account to facilitate theirrefund to the user. An amount of financial funds equivalent to thosetransferred to the intermediary account, but associated with thefinancial institution, are then used to generate the financialtransaction. Once the financial transaction is generated, fraudidentification data is then generated from the duress shared secret anddata associated with the financial transaction. In one embodiment, thedata associated with the financial transaction comprises a uniquetransaction identifier familiar to those of skill in the art. In oneembodiment, the duress shared secret comprises a cryptographic key. Inanother embodiment, cryptographic operations are performed to encryptthe fraud identification data. In various embodiments, the proceeds arecash funds 216, which are processed and physically tagged with the fraudidentification information. In one embodiment, the physical tagging isperformed by the transaction tagging module 154. In one embodiment, thecash funds 216 are invisibly imprinted with the fraud identificationinformation. As an example, the fraud identification may be imprintedwith ink that is only visible under ultraviolet light. In oneembodiment, the fraud identification data comprises a serial number ofthe cash funds 216, such as a currency serial number printed on abanknote. The tagged cash funds 216 proceeds are then disbursed, such asfrom an ATM access device 204.

In various other embodiments, the proceeds of the financial transactionare electronic funds, which are tagged with electronic fraudidentification data. In one embodiment, the electronic tagging isperformed by the transaction tagging module 154. In another embodiment,a cryptographic operation is performed to embed the fraud identificationdata within the electronic funds data. In various embodiments, theelectronic funds data comprises a routing transit number, aninterbanking clearing number, of an international bank account number.In various other embodiments, the electronic funds data comprises adestination financial account number. Once the electronic funds aretagged with fraud identification data, the funds transfer of theelectronic funds is initiated. In various embodiments, the initiation ofthe funds transfer is performed by the transaction processing module152.

In various embodiments, cash funds proceeds of a duress financialtransaction are received from an originating financial institution 218by a receiving financial institution, such as an intermediate financialinstitution 222 or a destination financial institution 228. Oncereceived, the tagged cash funds are processed to extract theirassociated fraud identification data. As an example, the invisiblyimprinted fraud identification data may be scanned with an ultravioletscanner and then converted with an optical character recognition (OCR)application to generate a text file. A time-stamped fraud identificationquery is generated and the extracted fraud identification data isappended. The time-stamped fraud identification query is thentransmitted to law enforcement agencies and the originating financialinstitution 218 for processing. In various embodiments, cryptographicoperations familiar to skilled practitioners of the art are performed onthe fraud identification data to extract information related to theoriginating financial institution 218.

If the query response was positive, then a determination is made whetherthe tagged cash funds are to be deposited or exchanged. If they are tobe deposited, then information associated with the deposit account isdetermined and a time-stamped tagged cash funds alert is then generatedby the receiving financial institution 222, 228. The extracted fraudidentification data is appended to the time-stamped tagged cash fundsalert, which is then transmitted to law enforcement agencies and theoriginating financial institution 218. The time-stamped tagged cashfunds alert, with the appended fraud identification data, is then storedas fraud trail data in the repository of financial transaction, fraudidentification, and fraud trail data 210. Data associated with thetarget deposit account for the tagged cash funds is then processed totag it with the extracted fraud identification data. The tagged cashfunds amount is then deposited in the target deposit account and anaccount hold is placed on the target deposit account in the amount ofthe tagged cash funds. The tagged cash funds are then retained forevidence in criminal prosecution and recovery by their originatingfinancial institution 218.

In various embodiments, tagged electronic funds proceeds of a duressfinancial transaction (EFT) are received from an originating financialinstitution 218 by a receiving financial institution, such as anintermediate financial institution 222 or a destination financialinstitution 228. Once received, the tagged EFT is processed to extractits associated fraud identification data and to determine informationrelated to its target receiving account. A time-stamped acknowledgementof the receipt of a tagged EFT (“tagged EFT receipt”) is then generated.The extracted fraud identification data and the information related tothe target receiving account are then appended to the tagged EFTreceipt, which is then transmitted to law enforcement agencies,financial network operators, financial clearing houses, and theoriginating financial institution. The tagged EFT receipt is thenprocessed and stored in the repository of financial transaction, fraudidentification, and fraud trail data 210. The tagged EFT funds are thendeposited into the target receiving account.

The target receiving account is then monitored for the generation of anew funds transfer. If a new EFT is generated from the target receivingaccount, then the data associated with the outbound EFT is processed todetermine information associated with the originating account and thedestination account. A time-stamped tagged EFT alert (“tagged EFTalert”) is generated and the extracted fraud identification data, alongwith the information associated with the originating account and thedestination account, are appended. The tagged EFT alert is thentransmitted to law enforcement agencies, financial network operators,clearing houses, and the financial institution that originated theoriginal tagged EFT. Data related to the outbound EFT is then processedand tagged with the extracted fraud identification data, followed by theinitiation of the outbound EFT. The tagged EFT alert is then stored inthe repository of financial transaction, fraud identification, and fraudtrail data 210. It will be apparent to skilled practitioners of the artthat a fraud audit trail is provided by successively tagging theproceeds of newly originated EFTs, such as the follow-on fraudulentfunds transfer 224, with fraud identification data generated byoriginating financial institution 218.

In various embodiments, tagged funds are recovered by first selecting atagged financial transaction initiated by a user while under duress,followed by extracting its associated fraud identification data.Repositories of fraud trail data, as described in greater detail herein,are then queried to identify matching fraud identification data. Oncematching fraud identification data has been identified, then fraud traildata corresponding to the matching fraud identification data isretrieved and then processed to determine receiving, or destination,account information. The receiving account is then queried to determineavailability of funds. If the receiving account has sufficient funds tocover the amount of the tagged financial transaction, then a rescissiontransaction 230 is performed to recover the amount of the taggedfinancial transaction. In various embodiments, the rescissiontransaction 230 is performed by a transaction rescission module of afraud management system.

However, if there are insufficient funds available in the receivingaccount to cover the entire amount of the tagged financial transaction,then a rescission transaction 230 is performed to recover the availablefunds in the receiving account up. A repository of fraud trail data 210at the receiving financial institution 222 is queried to identify taggedfunds transfer transactions originating from the receiving account. Datarelated to the follow-on tagged funds transfer transactions 224 is thenprocessed for prioritization. A follow-on tagged funds transfertransaction 224 is selected and then processed to extract financialtransaction information related to the destination financial institution226 and the destination account of the follow-on electronic fundstransaction 224. The destination account is then queried to determinethe availability of funds and the process is continued with a follow-onrescission transaction 228.

FIGS. 3 a-b are a generalized flowchart of the operation of a fraudmanagement system as implemented in accordance with an embodiment of thedisclosure for the management of shared secrets. In this embodiment,shared secret management operations are begun in block 302, followed bya user accessing a shared secret management module of a fraud managementsystem in block 304. The shared secret management module receives theuser's identification (ID) and a shared secret, such as a personalidentification number (PIN) or a password, in block 306. A determinationis then made in block 308 whether the provided user ID and shared secretare valid. If not, a determination is then made in block 310 regardingwhether the user resubmits a user ID and shared secret. If so, theprocess is continued, proceeding to block 306. Otherwise, adetermination is made in block 340 whether to continue shared secretmanagement operations. If so, then the process is continued, proceedingto block 306. Otherwise shared secret management operations are ended inblock 342.

However, if it is determined in block 308 that the user ID and sharedsecret provided by the user is valid, then a determination is made inblock 312 whether to modify an existing shared secret. If so, then theexisting shared secret is modified in block 314. As an example, the usermay wish to change their existing PIN or password. A determination isthen made in block 338 whether to continue operations related to themodification of shared secrets. If so, the process is continued,proceeding to block 312. Otherwise, the process is continued, proceedingto block 340. However, if it is determined in block 312 not to modify anexisting shared secret, then a determination is made in block 316whether to create a duress shared secret. If so, then a duress sharedsecret is created in block 318.

As used herein, a duress shared secret refers to a shared secretprovided by a user to indicate that they are providing access to afinancial account while under duress. As an example, a user may becoerced into providing such access as a result of being physically,verbally, or emotionally intimidated, either directly or indirectly. Tofurther the example, a criminal may threaten physical harm to a lovedone of the user being held hostage if such access is not provided. Manysuch situations for a user being under duress are possible and theforegoing is not intended to limit the spirit, scope, or intent of thedisclosure. In various embodiments, the duress shared secret may besimilar to the shared secret normally used by the user. As an example, apunctuation mark (e.g., ‘!’) may be appended to a password, or anadditional digit (e.g., ‘9’) may be appended to a PIN. As anotherexample, the duress shared secret may be a mnemonic, such as the firstletter of each word in the phrase “I am under duress, help me” (IAUDHM).In one embodiment, the duress shared secret is created by the user. Inanother embodiment, the duress shared secret is automatically created bya shared secret management module of a fraud management system. It willbe apparent to those of skill in the art that the generation of manysuch shared secrets are possible.

Once the duress shared secret is created in block 318, instructions tobe executed by the fraud management system upon use of the duress sharedsecret are created and configured in block 320. More specifically, theinstructions are used to determine the degree of access provided to afinancial account, the information related to the financial account thatis displayed, and the actions that are allowed to be performed. As anexample, use of a duress shared secret may result in the execution ofits associated instruction display what appears to be informationrelated to a checking account or a brokerage account. In reality, thedisplayed information is spoofed to show false information, such aslower balances or amounts. As another example, the execution of theassociated instructions may display accurate financial accountinformation, but operations such as a financial funds transfer may bespoofed instead. To further the example, a criminal may know that thevictim has a large account balance in their checking account and theywish to force the victim to transfer the funds with wire transferinstructions. If the victim provides a duress shared secret that resultsin its associated instructions being executed to show a low accountbalance, then the criminal may further threaten, or physically harm, thevictim. In this example, the victim may provide a second duress sharedsecret whose associated instructions are executed to show the actualaccount balance. However, in reality the wire transfer operations arespoofed. The criminal, thinking that the wire transfer has beencompleted, may then leave the scene of the crime. However, today'scriminals are becoming more sophisticated and may be able to access adestination account to ensure that an electronic funds transfer wasactually completed. If this is the case, then the victim may provide athird duress shared secret whose associated instructions not onlydisplay the accurate account, but also allow the wire transferoperations to be performed. However, unbeknownst to the criminal, theduress shared secret is combined with other information, such as thevictim's account number and timestamp information. As described ingreater detail herein, the information is then processed to generatefraud identification information, which is then tagged to the proceedsof the fraudulently generated financial transaction. The tagged proceedscan then be tracked through the banking system and subsequentlyrecovered.

In addition, the instructions may include issuing a security alert to alaw enforcement agency, notifying the fraud department of the financialinstitution associated with the victim's account, or notifying frauddetection systems associated with the victim's other financial accounts.As an example, if the duress shared secret is provided at an automatedteller machine (ATM), then a silent alarm may be sent to the police,along with the physical location of the ATM. As another example, the useof a duress shared secret used from a personal computer located in thevictim's home may issue a silent alarm to summon the police to thevictim's home. It will be apparent to skilled practitioners of the artthat many such instructions are possible and the foregoing is notintended to limit the spirit, scope, or intent of the disclosure. Onceinstructions are created and configured for the duress shared secret inblock 320, they are associated with the duress shared secret in block322. A determination is then made in block 336 whether to continueduress shared secret operations. If not, then the process is continued,proceeding to block 338. Otherwise, the process is continued, proceedingto block 316.

However, if it is determined in block 316 not to create a duress sharedsecret, then a determination is made in block 324 whether to modify anexisting duress shared secret. If not, then the process is continued,proceeding to block 336. Otherwise, an existing duress shared secret isselected in block 326 and it is then modified in block 338. As anexample, the user may wish to modify an existing duress shared secretfrom a series of numbers to an alphanumeric string. A determination isthen made in block 330 whether to modify the instructions associatedwith the selected duress shared secret. If not, then the process iscontinued, proceeding to block 336. Otherwise the instructionsassociated with the selected duress shared secret are retrieved in block332 and then modified in block 334. As an example, the user may decideto modify the associated instructions such that a first checking accountwith a low account balance is displayed, but a second checking accountwith a high account balance is not. The process is then continued,proceeding to block 336.

FIGS. 4 a-d are a generalized flowchart of the operation of a fraudmanagement system as implemented in accordance with an embodiment of thedisclosure for tagging the proceeds of a financial transaction initiatedby a user while under duress. In this embodiment, operations for taggingthe proceeds of duress financial transactions are begun in block 402,followed by receiving a request to access a financial account in block404. As used herein, a duress financial transaction is a financialtransaction initiated by a user while under duress, as described ingreater detail herein. A user's identification (ID) and a shared secret,such as a personal identification number (PIN) or a password, arereceived in block 406. A determination is then made in block 408 whetherthe provided user ID and shared secret are valid. If not, adetermination is then made in block 410 regarding whether the userresubmits a user ID and shared secret. If so, the process is continued,proceeding to block 406. Otherwise, a determination is made in block 474whether to select another financial account to access. If so, theprocess is continued, proceeding to block 404. Otherwise, adetermination is made in block 472 whether to end operations for taggingthe proceeds of duress financial transactions. If not, then the processis continued, proceeding to block 474. Otherwise, operations for taggingthe proceeds of duress financial transactions are ended in block 476.

However, if it is determined in block 408 that the user ID and sharedsecret are valid, then a determination is made in block 412 whether theprovided shared secret is a duress shared secret. As used herein, aduress shared secret refers to a shared secret provided by a user toindicate that they are providing access to a financial account whileunder duress. If it is determined in block 412 that the provided sharedsecret is not a duress shared secret, then available financial accountoperations are displayed in block 414. A financial operation to performis then selected in block 416, followed by the display of financialaccount information related to the selected operation in block 418. Theselected financial account operation is then performed in block 420,followed by a determination in block 422 whether to select anotherfinancial account operation to perform. If so, then the process iscontinued, proceeding to block 414. Otherwise, the process is continued,proceeding to block 474. However, if it is determined in block 412 thatthe provided shared secret is a duress shared secret, the instructionsassociated with the duress shared secret are processed in block 424.

In block 426, fraud monitoring operations are initiated and duress eventnotifications are generated and delivered, as described in greaterdetail herein, indicating that the financial account is being accessedwhile the user is under duress. A determination is then made in block428 whether the associated instructions include the monitoring of otherfinancial accounts associated with the user. If so, then the otherfinancial accounts are monitored for fraudulent activity in block 430.Otherwise, a determination is made in block 432 whether the instructionsinclude the notification of law enforcement authorities. If so, then thelaw enforcement authorities listed in the associated instructions arenotified in block 434 and are provided their respectively requestedresponse. Otherwise, available financial account operations, per theassociated instructions, are displayed in block 436 as described ingreater detail herein. An available financial account operation isselected in block 438 to perform according to the associatedinstructions. Financial information associated with the selectedfinancial account operation is then displayed, according to theassociated instructions, in block 440. A determination is then made inblock 442 whether the selected financial account operation is to performa financial account operation to generate a financial transaction. Innot, then the selected account operation is performed, according to theassociated instructions, in block 444. A determination is then made inblock 446 whether to select another financial account operation. If so,then the process is continued, proceeding to block 436. Otherwise, theprocess is continued, proceeding to block 474.

However, if it is determined in block 442 that the selected financialaccount operation is to perform a financial transaction, then input isreceived to generate a financial transaction in block 448. As anexample, the input received may include a request to disburse $400.00 incash funds from an automated teller machine (ATM). As another example,the input received may include a request to transfer $25,000.00 from asavings account to a financial account specified by a criminal. As yetanother example, the input received may include a request to place amarket order to sell $600,000.00 worth of securities at their currentmarket price. It will be apparent to those of skill in the art that manysuch examples of received input are possible and the foregoing is notintended to limit the spirit, scope, or intent of the disclosure.

The received input is processed in block 450 to determine the fundsamount of the financial transaction, followed by making a determinationin block 452 whether the instructions include using funds from afinancial account associated with a financial institution. As anexample, a financial institution may have a financial account that isused for funding fraudulently generated financial transactions. If it isdetermined in block 452 not to use a financial account associated with afinancial institution, then the received input and the instructionsassociated with the duress shared secret are processed in block 454 togenerate a financial transaction using funds from a financial accountassociated with the user. However, if it is determined in block 452 touse a financial account associated with a financial institution, then anamount of funds equal to the received input amount is transferred fromthe financial account associated with the user to an intermediaryaccount in block 456. As an example, the intermediary account may be anaccount where funds are held in the event of the occurrence of a duressevent. Once the duress event has passed, then the user's funds can berecovered from the intermediary account. The received input and theinstructions associated with the duress shared secret are then processedin block 458 to generate a financial transaction using financial accountinformation from a financial account associated with the user and fundsfrom a financial account associated with financial institution. Once thefinancial transaction is generated in block 454 or block 458, fraudidentification data is then generated in block 460 from the duressshared secret and data associated with the financial transaction. In oneembodiment, the data associated with the financial transaction comprisesa unique transaction identifier familiar to those of skill in the art.In one embodiment, the duress shared secret comprises a cryptographickey. In various embodiments, cryptographic operations are performed toencrypt the fraud identification data. A determination is then made inblock 462 whether the proceeds of the financial transaction are cashfunds or electronic funds. If it is determined in block 462 that theproceeds are cash funds, then they are processed in block 464 and taggedwith the fraud identification information. In one embodiment, the cashfunds are invisibly imprinted with the fraud identification information.As an example, the fraud identification may be imprinted with ink thatis only visible under ultraviolet light. In one embodiment, the fraudidentification data comprises a cash funds serial number, such as acurrency serial number printed on a banknote. The tagged cash fundsproceeds are then disbursed in block 466 and the process continues,proceeding to block 474.

However, if it is determined in block 462 that the proceeds of thefinancial transaction are electronic funds, then data associated withelectronic funds is tagged with the fraud identification data in block468. In one embodiment, a cryptographic operation is performed to embedthe fraud identification data within the electronic funds data. Invarious embodiments, the electronic funds data comprises a routingtransit number, an interbanking clearing number, of an internationalbank account number. In various other embodiments, the electronic fundsdata comprises a destination financial account number. Once theelectronic funds are tagged with fraud identification data in block 470,the funds transfer of the electronic funds is initiated in block 470. Adetermination is then made in block 472 whether to end operations fortagging the proceeds of duress financial transactions. If not, then theprocess is continued, proceeding to block 474. Otherwise, operations fortagging the proceeds of duress financial transactions are ended in block476.

FIGS. 5 a-b are a generalized flowchart of the operation of a fraudmanagement system as implemented in accordance with an embodiment of thedisclosure for tracking tagged cash funds proceeds of a financialtransaction initiated by a user under duress. In this embodiment,operations for the tracking of tagged cash funds proceeds of a duressfinancial transaction are begun in block 502, followed by the receipt ofcash funds by a receiving financial institution in block 504. In block506, the cash funds are processed to determine if they are tagged. As anexample, banknotes may be viewed under an ultraviolet light to revealinvisibly imprinted fraud identification data. A determination is thenmade in block 508 whether the cash funds are tagged. If not, then normalcash funds processing operations are performed in block 520 and theprocess is continued, proceeding to block 504.

However, if is determined in block 508 that the cash funds are tagged,then they are further processed in block 510 to extract their associatedfraud identification data. As an example, the invisibly imprinted fraudidentification data may be scanned with an ultraviolet scanner and thenconverted with an optical character recognition (OCR) application togenerate a text file. In block 512, a time-stamped fraud identificationquery is generated. The extracted fraud identification data is thenappended in block 514 to the time-stamped fraud identification query,which is then transmitted to law enforcement agencies and theoriginating financial institution for processing. In variousembodiments, cryptographic operations familiar to skilled practitionersof the art are performed on the fraud identification data to extractinformation related to the originating financial institution. As anexample, the receiving financial institution may use their private keyand a corresponding public key used by an originating financialinstitution to generate fraud identification data.

A determination is then made in block 518 whether the query response waspositive. If not, then the process is continued, proceeding to block520. As an example, the cash funds may have been the proceeds of aduress financial transaction that has been resolved, and the fraudidentification data is no longer associated with an unresolved criminalincident, but remains invisibly imprinted on a banknote. However, if itis determined in block 518 that the query response was positive, then adetermination is made in block 522 whether the tagged cash funds are tobe deposited or exchanged. As an example, a criminal may attempt tolaunder the tagged cash funds by exchanging them for another form offinancial value, such as a cashiers check or a money order.Alternatively, the criminal may attempt to deposit the tagged cash fundsinto a deposit account and then launder the funds with a wire transferto another financial account. Skilled practitioners of the art willrealize that many such money laundering schemes are known.

If it is determined in block 522 that the tagged cash funds are to bedeposited, then information associated with the deposit account isdetermined in block 524. A time-stamped tagged cash funds alert is thengenerated in block 526 by the receiving financial institution. Theextracted fraud identification data is appended in block 528 to thetime-stamped tagged cash funds alert, which is then transmitted in block530 to law enforcement agencies and the originating financialinstitution. The time-stamped tagged cash funds alert, with the appendedfraud identification data, is then stored as fraud trail data in block532. Data associated with the target deposit account for the tagged cashfunds is then processed in block 534 to tag it with the extracted fraudidentification data. The tagged cash funds amount is then deposited inthe target deposit account in block 536 and an account hold is placed onthe target deposit account in the amount of the tagged cash funds inblock 538. The tagged cash funds are then retained in block 540 forevidence in criminal prosecution and recovery by their originatingfinancial institution. A determination is then made in block 546 whetherto continue operations for the tracking of tagged cash funds proceeds.If so, the process is continued, proceeding to block 504. Otherwise,operations for the tracking of tagged cash funds proceeds are ended inblock 548. However, if it is determined in block 522 that the taggedcash funds are to be exchanged, the law enforcement agencies are alertedin block 542 and the requested cash funds exchange transaction isdeclined in block 544. The process is then continued, proceeding toblock 540.

FIGS. 6 a-b are a generalized flowchart of the operation of a fraudmanagement system as implemented in accordance with an embodiment of thedisclosure for tracking tagged electronic funds proceeds of a financialtransaction initiated by a user while under duress. In this embodiment,operations for the tracking of tagged electronic funds proceeds of aduress financial transaction are begun in block 602, followed by thereceipt of electronic funds by a receiving financial institution inblock 604. In block 606, the electronic funds are processed to determineif they have been tagged with fraud identification data as described ingreater detail herein. A determination is then made in block 608 whetherthe electronic funds are tagged. If not, then normal electronic fundstransfer (EFT) processing operations are performed in block 610 and theprocess is continued, proceeding to block 604.

However, if is determined in block 608 that the EFT is tagged, then itis further processed in block 612 to extract its associated fraudidentification data. In block 614, the EFT data is then processed todetermine information related to its target receiving account. Atime-stamped acknowledgement of the receipt of a tagged EFT (“tagged EFTreceipt”) is then generated in block 616. The extracted fraudidentification data and the information related to the target receivingaccount are then appended in block 618 to the tagged EFT receipt. Thetagged EFT receipt is then transmitted in block 620 to law enforcementagencies, financial network operators, financial clearing houses, andthe originating financial institution. The tagged EFT receipt is thenprocessed and stored in block 622 as fraud trail data. The tagged EFTfunds are then deposited into the target receiving account in block 624.

The target receiving account is then monitored in block 626 for thegeneration of a new funds transfer. A determination is then made inblock 628 whether a new funds transfer has been generated to transferfunds out of the target receiving account. If not, then a determinationis made in block 644 whether to continue monitoring of the targetreceiving account. If so, then the process is continued, proceeding toblock 626. Otherwise, a determination is made in block 646 whether tocontinue operations for the tracking of tagged electronic funds. If so,then the process is continued, proceeding to block 604. Otherwise,operations for the tracking of tagged electronic funds are ended inblock 648.

However, if it is determined in block 628 that a new EFT has beengenerated from the target receiving account, then the data associatedwith the outbound EFT are processed in block 630 to determineinformation associated with the originating account and the destinationaccount. A time-stamped tagged EFT alert (“tagged EFT alert”) isgenerated in block 632. Then in block 634 the extracted fraudidentification data, and the information associated with the originatingaccount and the destination account, are appended the tagged EFT alert.The tagged EFT alert is then transmitted in block 636 to law enforcementagencies, financial network operators, clearing houses, and thefinancial institution that originated the original tagged EFT. Datarelated to the outbound EFT is then processed and tagged with theextracted fraud identification data in block 638, followed by theinitiation of the outbound EFT in block 640. The tagged EFT alert isthen stored in block 642 by the receiving financial institution as fraudtrail data and the process is continued, proceeding with block 644. Itwill be apparent to skilled practitioners of the art that a fraud audittrail is provided by successively tagging the proceeds of newlyoriginated EFTs with fraud identification data generated by financialinstitution that originated the original tagged EFT.

FIGS. 7 a-b are a generalized flowchart of the operation of a fraudmanagement system as implemented in accordance with an embodiment of thedisclosure for recovering tagged funds proceeds of a financialtransaction initiated by a user under duress. In this embodiment, taggedfunds recovery operations are begun in block 702, followed by theselection in block 704 of a tagged financial transaction initiated by auser while under duress. In block 706, the duress shared secretassociated with the selected duress financial transaction is determined.Then, in block 708, the duress shared secret is used to process thetagged electronic transaction to extract its associated fraudidentification data. Repositories of fraud trail data, as described ingreater detail herein, are then queried in block 710 to identifymatching fraud identification data. A determination is made in block 712whether matching fraud data has been identified. If not, then adetermination is made in block 744 whether to continue tagged fundsrecovery operations. If so, then the process is continued, proceeding toblock 704. Otherwise, tagged funds recovery operations are ended inblock 746.

However, if it is determined in block 712 that matching fraudidentification data has been identified, then fraud trail datacorresponding to the matching fraud identification data is retrieved inblock 714. The retrieved fraud trail data is then processed in block 716to extract financial transaction information, which is then processed inblock 718 to determine receiving, or destination, account information.In one embodiment, the fraud trail data is likewise further processed toextract associated fraud identification data. As an example, in variousembodiments, additional fraud identification data may have been added byintermediate financial institutions. Once the receiving account data hasbeen extracted in block 718, the receiving account is then queried inblock 720 to determine availability of funds. A determination is thenmade in block 722 to determine if the receiving account has sufficientfunds to cover the amount of the tagged financial transaction. If so,then a rescission transaction familiar to skilled practitioners of theart is performed in block 724 to recover the amount of the taggedfinancial transaction from the receiving account. In variousembodiments, the rescission transaction is performed by a transactionrescission module of a fraud management system. The process is thencontinued, proceeding to block 744.

However, if it is determined in block 722 that there are insufficientfunds available in the receiving account to cover the entire amount ofthe tagged financial transaction, then a determination is made in block726 if the available funds amount in the receiving account is greaterthan zero. If so, then a rescission transaction is performed in block728 to recover the available funds in the receiving account up to theremaining balance of funds to recover. Once the rescission transactionis performed in block 728, or if it is determined in block 726 that theavailable funds in the receiving account are not greater than zero, thenthe remaining amount of funds to recover is determined in block 730. Adetermination is then made in block 732 whether all funds have beenrecovered. If not, the process is continued, proceeding to block 744.Otherwise, a repository of fraud trail data at the receiving financialinstitution is queried in block 734 to identify tagged funds transfertransactions originating from the receiving account. Data related to thenewly originated tagged funds transfer transactions is then processedfor prioritization in block 736. In one embodiment, the related taggedfunds transfer transactions are prioritized according to theirtransaction time stamp. In another embodiment the related tagged fundstransfer transactions are prioritized according to the amount of thetransaction. A related tagged funds transfer transaction is thenselected in block 738 and then processed in block 740 to extractfinancial transaction information related to the destination account ofthe electronic funds transaction. The destination account is thenqueried to determine the availability of funds in block 742 and theprocess is continued, proceeding to block 726.

The flowchart and block diagrams in the figures illustrate thearchitecture, functionality, and operation of possible implementationsof systems, methods and computer program products according to variousembodiments of the disclosure. Accordingly, each block in the flowchartor block diagrams may represent a module, segment, or portion of code,which comprises one or more executable instructions for implementing thespecified logical function(s). In certain alternative implementations,the functions performed in a particular block may occur in an order thatis different than what is noted in the figures. For example, two blocksshown in succession may, in fact, be executed substantiallyconcurrently, or the blocks may sometimes be executed in the reverseorder, depending upon the functionality involved. It will also be notedthat each block of the block diagrams and/or flowchart illustrations,and combinations of blocks in the block diagrams and/or flowchartillustrations, can be implemented by special purpose hardware-basedsystems that perform the specified functions or acts, or combinations ofspecial purpose hardware and computer instructions.

The terminology used herein is for the purpose of describing particularembodiments only and is not intended to be limiting of the disclosure.As used herein, the singular forms “a,” “an” and “the” are intended toinclude the plural forms as well, unless the context clearly indicatesotherwise. It will be further understood that the terms “comprises”and/or “comprising,” when used in this specification, specify thepresence of stated features, integers, steps, operations, elements,and/or components, but do not preclude the presence or addition of oneor more other features, integers, steps, operations, elements,components, and/or groups thereof. The term “embodiment” can be used todescribe any aspect, feature, process or step, any combination thereof,and/or any portion thereof, of the disclosure and should not beinterpreted as limiting the scope of the application or claims.

While the disclosure has been described by reference to particularembodiments, such references do not imply a limitation and no suchlimitation is to be inferred. As such, the disclosure includes any andall embodiments having equivalent elements, modifications, omissions,combinations (e.g., of aspects across various embodiments), adaptations,alterations, and equivalents in form and function. As will be furtherappreciated by those skilled in the pertinent arts, the disclosure has anumber of aspects and embodiments, and various embodiments may includeoverlapping features.

For example, the above-discussed embodiments may include softwaremodules that include script, batch, or other executable files for theperformance of certain tasks. These software modules may be stored on amachine-readable or computer-readable storage medium such as a diskdrive. Storage devices used for storing software modules in accordancewith various embodiments may include magnetic floppy disks, hard disks,or optical discs such as CD-ROMs or DVDs. A storage device used forstoring firmware or hardware modules in accordance with an embodimentmay also include a semiconductor-based memory, which may be permanently,removably or remotely coupled to a microprocessor/memory system. Thus,the software modules may be stored within a computer system memory toconfigure the computer system to perform the functions of the module.Other new and various types of computer-readable storage media may beused to store the modules discussed herein. Additionally, those skilledin the art will recognize that the separation of functionality intomodules is for illustrative purposes. Alternative embodiments may mergethe functionality of multiple modules into a single module or may imposean alternate decomposition of functionality of modules. For example, asoftware module for calling sub-modules may be decomposed so that eachsub-module performs its function and passes control directly to anothersub-module. In addition, each of the referenced components in thisembodiment may be comprised of a plurality of components, eachinteracting with the other in a distributed environment. Furthermore,other embodiments may expand on the referenced embodiment to extend thescale and reach of the system's implementation.

The description of the disclosure has been presented for purposes ofillustration and description, but is not intended to be exhaustive orlimited in the form disclosed. It will be apparent to those of skill inthe art that many modifications and variations are possible withoutdeparting from the scope and spirit of the disclosure, giving fullcognizance to equivalents in all respects.

1. A non-transitory computer-usable medium embodying computer programcode, the computer program code including a set of duress instructionscorresponding to a duress shared secret data element, said computerprogram code when executed by a processor cause the processor to performa method, the method comprising: receiving user input data comprisingsaid duress shared secret data element; processing said duressinstructions to generate a first financial transaction from financialaccount data of a repository of financial account data associated with auser, said first financial transaction comprising financial transactiondata, wherein said duress instructions include an indication to use oneof funds from a financial account associated with a financialinstitution and funds from a financial account associated with said userfor said first financial transaction; generating fraud identificationdata from said financial transaction data and said duress shared secretdata element; processing proceeds of said first financial transaction totag said proceeds with said fraud identification data; and processing arescission transaction to recover said tagged proceeds.
 2. The computerusable medium of claim 1, wherein processing the proceeds of said firstfinancial transaction includes: transferring the proceeds from saidfinancial account associated with said user to an intermediary account;generating a second financial transaction using an equivalent amount ofsaid financial funds corresponding to said financial account associatedwith a second financial institution; and processing said proceeds ofsaid second financial institution to tag said proceeds with said fraudidentification data.
 3. The computer usable medium of claim 1, whereinsaid proceeds comprise cash funds invisibly imprinted with said fraudidentification data.
 4. The computer usable medium of claim 1, whereinsaid proceeds comprise electronic funds further comprising electronicfunds data.
 5. The computer usable medium of claim 4, wherein saidelectronic funds data comprise a unique financial transaction trackingidentifier further comprising said fraud identification data.
 6. Thecomputer usable medium of claim 1, wherein said duress shared secretdata element comprises a cryptographic key.
 7. The computer usablemedium of claim 1, wherein the computer program code is provided to aclient computer from a server, wherein said server is located at aremote location.
 8. The computer usable medium of claim 1, wherein thecomputer program code is provided as a service on an on-demand basis,wherein said service is provided by a service provider.
 9. A system foridentifying financial transactions, comprising: a user interfaceoperable to receive input data from a user, said input data comprising aduress shared secret data element; and a computing device with aprocessor and memory for storing executable instructions, including aset of duress instructions corresponding to said duress shared secretdata element, that are executable by the processor, wherein theprocessor is programmed to: process said duress instructions to generatea first financial transaction from financial account data of arepository of financial account data associated with said user, saidfirst financial transaction comprising financial transaction data,wherein said instructions include an indication to use one of funds froma financial account associated with a financial institution and fundsfrom a financial account associated with said user for said firstfinancial transaction; generate fraud identification data from saidfinancial transaction data and said duress shared secret data element;process proceeds of said financial transaction to tag said proceeds withsaid fraud identification data; and process a rescission transaction torecover said tagged proceeds.
 10. The system of claim 9, wherein: saidproceeds of said first financial transaction are transferred from saidfinancial account associated with said user to an intermediary account;a second financial transaction is generated using an equivalent amountof said financial funds corresponding to said financial accountassociated with a financial institution; and proceeds of said secondfinancial institution are processed to tag said proceeds with said fraudidentification data.
 11. The system of claim 9, wherein said proceedscomprise cash funds invisibly imprinted with said fraud identificationdata.
 12. The system of claim 9, wherein said proceeds compriseelectronic funds further comprising electronic funds data.
 13. Thesystem of claim 12, wherein said electronic funds data comprise a uniquefinancial transaction tracking identifier further comprising said fraudidentification data.
 14. The system of claim 9, wherein said duressshared secret data element comprises a cryptographic key.
 15. Anon-transitory computer-usable medium embodying computer program code,the computer program code including a set of duress instructionscorresponding to a duress shared secret data element, said computerprogram code when executed by a processor cause the processor to performa method, the method comprising: receiving user input data comprising asaid duress shared secret data element; processing said duressinstructions to generate a financial transaction from financial accountdata of a repository of financial account data associated with a user,said financial transaction comprising financial transaction data,wherein said duress instructions include an indication to use one offunds from a financial account associated with a financial institutionand funds from a financial account associated with said user for saidfirst financial transaction; generating fraud identification data fromsaid financial transaction data and said duress shared secret dataelement; processing proceeds of said first financial transaction to tagsaid proceeds with said fraud identification data; and processing arescission transaction to recover said tagged proceeds.
 16. The computerusable medium of claim 15, wherein a duress event notification comprisesa unique financial transaction tracking identifier further comprisingsaid fraud identification data.
 17. The computer usable medium of claim16, wherein a duress event notification is communicated to a financialinstitution generating said financial transaction, said financialtransaction data and said unique financial transaction trackingidentifier communicated with said duress event notification.
 18. Thecomputer usable medium of claim 15, wherein a duress event notificationcomprises location data corresponding to the location of a user.
 19. Thecomputer usable medium of claim 18, wherein said location data iscommunicated to a law enforcement agency.
 20. The computer usable mediumof claim 15, wherein a location data is communicated to a financialinstitution generating said financial transaction.
 21. The computerusable medium of claim 15, wherein the computer program code is providedto a client computer from a server, wherein said server is located at aremote location.
 22. The computer usable medium of claim 15, wherein thecomputer program code is provided as a service on an on-demand basis,wherein said service is provided by a service provider.
 23. Anon-transitory computer-usable medium embodying computer program code,the computer program code including a set of duress instructionscorresponding to a duress shared secret data element, said computerprogram code when executed by a processor cause the processor to performthe method: processing said duress instructions to generate a firstfinancial transaction from financial account data of a repository offinancial account data associated with said user, said first financialtransaction comprising a first set of said financial transaction data;generating said fraud identification data from said first set of saidfinancial transaction data and said duress shared secret data element,wherein said duress instructions include an indication to use one offunds from a financial account associated with a financial institutionand funds from a financial account associated with said user for saidfirst financial transaction; processing proceeds of said first financialtransaction to tag said proceeds with said fraud identification data;tracking said fraud identification data through a chain of secondfinancial transactions to generate fraud trail data comprising a secondset of said financial transaction data; and processing a rescissiontransaction to recover said tagged proceeds.
 24. The computer usablemedium of claim 23, wherein said proceeds comprise cash funds furthercomprising at least one serial number.
 25. The computer usable medium ofclaim 24, wherein said second set of financial transaction datacomprises said at least one serial number.
 26. The computer usablemedium of claim 23, wherein: said proceeds comprise electronic fundsfurther comprising electronic funds data; and said second set offinancial transaction data comprises a routing transit number.
 27. Thecomputer usable medium of claim 23, wherein: said proceeds compriseelectronic funds further comprising electronic funds data; and saidsecond set of financial transaction data comprises an interbankingclearing number.
 28. The computer usable medium of claim 23, wherein:said proceeds comprise electronic funds further comprising electronicfunds data; and said second set of financial transaction data comprisesan international bank account number.
 29. The computer usable medium ofclaim 23, wherein the computer program code is provided to a clientcomputer from a server, wherein said server is located at a remotelocation.
 30. The computer usable medium of claim 23, wherein thecomputer program code is provided as a service on an on-demand basis,wherein said service is provided by a service provider.